Decentralizing hydraulic society : Actor responses to institutional arrangements in Vietnam

Abstract: Irrigation decentralization has been launched worldwide with high expectations of improved governance, efficiency, and productivity through  democratic processes. However, there is widespread recognition that decentralization is, in reality, unlikely to bring about these positive outcomes. Poor implementation is widely blamed for these failures, but the current study argues that this is only partially true. Decentralization is usually treated as a technical way of power transfer that can be evaluated through quantitative  indicators. Much attention goes to searching solutions to constraints during implementation while less emphasis is on understanding of contexts, processes and the consequences of institutional changes. The common approach mainly focuses on local water users’ organizations but gives insufficient attention to the cross-level interactions between involved actors, their responses to reforms, and power relationships. This approach answers the question: what should be done, but not: why do constraints/limitations occur and why are such contradictory results obtained? In this way the approach itself diffuses some of the challenges in reality and the root of problems leading to surprise consequences and failures during  implementation.In this study, two irrigation systems in Vietnam were selected to examine the emerging decentralization processes, actors’ responses to the institutional changes, as well as the main options, challenges and constraints to decentralization. My ambition is also to further understand why constraints occur and have counterproductive effects. A mixed methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative methods, and cross-case analysis are applied. The database was built systematically, based on previous experience in this field, and participatory fieldwork. Decentralization is regarded as a power-laden process involving not just local organizations, but also state agencies, local authorities at different levels, state irrigation companies (IDMCs), and farmers. The study describes how institutional arrangements for decentralization have effects on the dynamics and relations of power between actors in multi-level governance, resulting in impacts on autonomy, accountability, participation, and incentives of involved actors.The analysis shows that the legal framework and several well-intended efforts for decentralization have been launched. However, outcomes in terms of power transfer and actors’ performance are not those expected. The current institutional arrangements have created major constraints: (i) imbalanced power relations, (ii) new resource allocation mechanisms creating dependency among actors, (iii) passiveness, vested interest and privilege within state agencies and IDMCs, and (iv) free-riding behavior and distrust among farmers. Prevailing conditions defy policy intentions by finding a new version of a centralized power structure at provincial level, in which power of state agencies and IDMCs are reinforced. Unexpected effects emerge on the autonomy, accountability, participation, and incentives of all involved actors. Decentralization of irrigation systems is a complex process, not merely a technical transfer of power. It is hard to achieve even with policy in place. All the complexities and implications of irrigation need to be thoroughly considered, with the dynamics in society included. Evaluations of decentralization based on production and economic terms are not enough. Impacts of institutional arrangements on power relations between actors, on their incentives, maneuver room in multi-level governance, and ability to comprehend and influence processes, need to be assessed thoroughly. Essential roles remain for central government when irrigation management is decentralized.