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Showing result 1 - 5 of 108 swedish dissertations matching the above criteria.
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1. Bargaining theory
Abstract : Can the outcome of bargaining between two rational parties be determined? Although much of the discussion in bargaining literature revolves around this question, no satisfactory answer has been found. A model based on simple assumptions of rational behavior is developed in an attempt to answer this question. READ MORE
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2. Bargaining and Communication in Games
Abstract : Chapter 2 investigates an infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly where firms with different discount factors bargain over which collusive price and market share to implement. The bargaining is modelled as a strategic game and the main results of the paper is that it shows existence of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and that the least patient firm's equilibrium market share is not monotone in its own discount factor. READ MORE
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3. Essays on Bargaining and Social Choice
Abstract : This thesis consists of three theoretical essays on Bargaining and Social Choice. The first essay addresses the problem of retaining the uniqueness of equilibrium when extending the Rubinstein model to accommodate more than two players. READ MORE
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4. The Onset of Ethnic War as a Bargaining Process : Testing a Signaling Model
Abstract : Most theories of ethnic conflict explain ethnic war by reference to the factors that motivate and enable ethnic groups to rebel. To rebel is to rise up against or challenge government authority; but for war to be the outcome of a challenge the government must attempt to forcefully reassert its authority. READ MORE
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5. Elusive Peacemakers : A Bargaining Perspective on Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts
Abstract : This composite dissertation explores mediation in internal armed conflicts from a bargaining perspective. Four separate essays investigate why mediation occurs, why it is successful, and why peace guarantors’ commitments are credible. Essay 1 examines the conditions under which mediation takes place. READ MORE