Value Grounded on Attitudes. Subjectivism in Value Theory

University dissertation from Lund University (Media-Tryck)

Abstract: Popular Abstract in English Does subjectivism in value theory — the view that value is grounded on attitudes — imply that when we think and talk about what is good and bad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires and other attitudes? Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterances are reports or expressions of the speaker’s attitude? Are subjectivists committed to an axiology according to which only preference satisfaction is valuable for its own sake? Are subjectivists disqualified from talking about intrinsic value? Is it a consequence of subjectivism that if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different things would be valuable? Is subjectivism a view on which things can be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? Are subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism? Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of subjectivism? Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters? In Value Grounded on Attitudes – Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz-Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.