Migration, Crime and Search in Spatial Markets

Abstract: Search Frictions, Unemployment, and Housing in Cities: Theory and PoliciesWe propose an urban search-matching model with land development. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium and then discuss the issue of efficiency. We find that the transportation and housing policies are more efficient if the unemployment rate is low, while the entry-cost policy is more efficient if the unemployment rate is high.Land Development, Search Frictions, and City StructureThis paper analyzes the interactions between labor and housing (and land) markets in a city. Unemployment, the spatial structure of a city, land development, housing demand, prices of housing and land are all endogenously determined. Then, we characterize two different spatial configurations. To better understand how two equilibria are affected by land and labor market parameters, we implement a comparative steady state analysis. We further explored the effects of policies.Search for Jobs or Crimes?This paper develops a competitive search model where unemployed workers allocate their time between the search for legal jobs and opportunities for committing crimes. We analyze the effects of labor market policies and crime policies. We show that the market equilibrium is socially inefficient when there is crime. We also find that workers' individual choice of years of education is less than the socially efficient one.Rural-Urban Migration in Developing Countries: Labor Market Institutions and PoliciesThe paper studies rural-urban migration under different labor market institutions in developing countries. Specifically, we consider two types of labor market institutions where workers in urban firms are unionized or not. We find that unionization of workers raises unemployment, urban wages, and rural employment, reduces rural wages and urban employment and increases inequality between the rural and the urban sector. We also compare two institutions under different policies.