Essays on Auctions

Abstract: The thesis is concerned with topics relating to auctions and competitive bidding. In the first chapter, the case of a procurement situation where multiple producers compete in price and quality, but are unable to commit to quality, is treated in a scoring auction context. An optimal scoring rule, for a buyer able to comittto a rule, is characterised. The second chapter is concerned with auctions where bidders are ex-ante asymmetric in the sense that one bidder may receive a fraction of the seller's profit. The issue of existence of equilibria under such circumstances is considered. It turns out there are in general no equilibria in continuous, strictly increasing strategies. The final chapter considers competition between privately held and state-owned businesses in the German auction for third-generation (3G) mobile telecommunications. A theoretical model is developed. The only equilibria of this model consistent with observed behaviour are equilibria where ownership does nor affect the outcome of the auction.