The pricing of shares with different voting power and the theory of oceanic games

University dissertation from Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.] (EFI)

Author: Kristian Rydqvist; Handelshögskolan I Stockholm.; [1986]

Keywords: Social Sciences Economics and Business Economics; Samhällsvetenskap Ekonomi och näringsliv Nationalekonomi; SOCIAL SCIENCES Business and economics Economics; SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP Ekonomi Nationalekonomi;

Abstract: The price difference for shares with different voting power is, in some sense, a quantitative measure of the value of control which is used empirically to investigate the theory of oceanic games, a model of the power distribution among shareholders. The results show that all shareholders, including the very small, have power in a competitive market for corporate control. The power, however, is unequally distributed among the shareholders, thus making the price of a share differ for shares inside or outside a large block of shares.

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